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"A Tale of Contrasts: Two Apartment Buildings Illustrate
How Public Housing Slid into Such a Mess."
The Wall Street Journal (February 28, 1995)
By John J. Fialka (Staff Reporter)
WASHINGTON--Edgewood Terrace I and Edgewood Terrace II are
nearly identical apartment buildings a mile-and-a-half
northeast of the U.S. Capitol. They were built in the early
1970s by the same man under the same rules and are fed by
the same subsidies from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
But Edgewood Terrace I has crumbled into a slum endangering
the whole area. Edgewood Terrace II is doing fine. Why?
The tale of the Edgewood twins is a study in contrast. It is
about how government policies allow one landlord to
perpetuate a slum while another runs a showcase of
low-income housing. It is about the misery of tenants,
locked in a struggle to find dignity while seeking help from
a government paralyzed by ever-shifting rules. It is, in a
nutshell, about how HUD-subsidized properties have come to
pockmark the nation's urban landscape.
A Rescue Attempt
Rogerline Nicholson, a
69-year-old retired government cook, has done everything she
can to save Edgewood I, her home for 22 years. "You've got
to fight to get something and then you've got to fight to
keep it," she says.
A formidable-looking woman who runs a tenants' association,
she has brought in a stream of community leaders, members of
Congress and HUD officials to show them the rats, the
bombed-out-looking vacant apartments, the overflowing
toilets, the leaky roof, the collapsed garage, the crumbling
walls, the dark hideouts used by drug dealers. The visitors
always shake their heads and go away. Nobody knows how to
put Edgewood I, like Humpty Dumpty, back together again.
The 302-unit Edgewood I--whose value government auditors now
put at a negative $10 million--is a mere blip on HUD's
balance sheet but also a reason the agency is fighting for
its life. There may be as much as $11 billion of similar
blips, "distressed properties" that HUD owns or is about to
own because it insures the mortgages HUD bureaucrats quietly
refer to these relics of a generation of failed housing
policies as, collectively, "the Museum." Congress can ax
HUD, but the Museum will haunt cities for years.
Mention Mrs. Nicholson to James Aldridge, the District of
Columbia's chief enforcement officer for housing, and he
rolls his eyes. His inspectors have spent man-years prowling
Edgewood I's dim brick lined corridors and have issued 202
code-violation tickets that remain unanswered. "She thinks I
have divine powers," he says. "She fails to understand that
the cost to bring that place up to code is so prohibitive
that we simply don't have those kind of resources."
A soft-spoken man with a walrus mustache, Mr. Aldridge is
frustrated because in his mind's eye he can still see
Edgewood I as it was when it opened in 1973, with its
manicured lawns and a swimming pool. "It was beautiful, a
showplace, a real plus to the neighborhood." It also was
designed to be beautiful to accountants. The Kennedy-era
programs that spawned it used tax incentives to attract
private investors to finance low-income housing. Eugene F.
Ford, 65, the Bethesda, MD., developer who built both
Edgewoods, is an old-fashioned landlord, a fussbudget who
looks for trouble before it arises. In Edgewood I, found it
in his maintenance reserves, the money landlords should set
aside to fix big things such as elevators and roofs. During
the late 1970s, double-digit inflation gobbled them up while
HUD rules kept rents static.
In 1982, the Reagan Administration allowed faster tax
depreciation of low- income rental property, making
apartments still more attractive to investors. Mr. Ford
solved his problem by selling Edgewood I to get enough money
to properly maintain Edgewood II.
The sale led in a profound change in management styles.
While Mr. Ford had spent a lifetime marketing and caring for
buildings, Edgewood I's buyer, Security Properties Inc., of
Seattle, was controlled by Paul H. Pfleger, who had made his
mark selling tax shelters to nationwide syndicates of
affluent investors.
Mr. Ford remembers pointing out the maintenance-reserves
problem to SPI managers. "They were pretty arrogant," he
says. "They took the attitude of telling me, who am I to be
telling them?"
Through brokers, SPI sold 98% of Edgewood I to a partnership
of 117 people, many of whom are doctors and dentists in the
West who have never even seen Edgewood I. While Mr. Pfleger
became a general partner, responsible for managing the
property, the others became limited partners with very
limited powers.
Both Mr. Ford and Mr. Pfleger have been major players in
owning and operating blocs of low income apartments, but,
viewed through the prism of the two Edgewoods, the
resemblance ends there.
Mr. Ford's Mid-City Financial Corp. has built 48 apartment
complexes and manages another 25. Nearly all are in the
Washington area and are partly funded by low-income housing
programs. He pours over weekly occupancy reports and visits
each building eight or nine times a year.
He tries to keep his buildings full by offering free
services, such as vans to take people shopping, and invites
in-home tutoring projects and sports clubs. Such moves
aren't entirely altruistic. "His earliest idea was if you
keep the kids occupied, they won't tear the place up," says
Leslie Steen, a co-worker. Mr. Ford also carefully screens
his tenants. "You take your hands off of a building like
this for three months and you might as well throw it away,"
Mr. Ford says.
In contrast, Mr. Pfleger is one of a new breed of landlords
that entered the low-income apartment business in the early
1980s. A former tax and insurance consultant, he responded
to questions from this newspaper only through his lawyers.
Asked Mr. Pfleger's age, they said he is "in his 50s." In
his written answers, he high lighted his overall philosophy:
"Please note that investing in affordable housing projects
is primarily tax-motivated."
Legal
Tactics
While Mr. Ford used his carpenters, plumbers and accountants
to satisfy HUD maintenance requirements at Edgewood II, Mr.
Pfleger relied heavily on his lawyers, who continually
appealed HUD's findings of mismanagement at Edgewood I to
higher HUD officials. Their requests for delays, reviews and
more subsidies make a file almost four inches thick. (HUD
officials say several other Pfleger controlled buildings
have received similar treatment and, like Edgewood I, are in
default on mortgage payments.)
Edgewood I, the building, has never made a profit, but
Edgewood I, the tax shelter, performed financial miracles
for Mr. Pfleger and his investors. As is usual in
syndications, many of their profits came up front, as
brokerage and management fees. Over the years, moreover,
they could write off as much as $8.7 million in depreciation
and losses against their taxes.
In the history of Edgewood I, however, this was but a brief,
shining moment. In 1986, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act,
which phased out the tax shelters. The change had little
effect on Edgewood II, where Mr. Ford kept plodding along
with his maintenance schedules. But Edgewood I continued its
inexorable slide.
Some Edgewood I owners concede being troubled by that today.
"I'm glad this is coming out now. There were some things
done back in the 1980s that were greedy," says C. Joseph
Tyree, a pediatric dentist in Munster, IN. Another limited
partner John E. Hall, a specialist in emergency medicine in
Anchorage, AK, says: "I don't believe in renters living in
dumps. If the government knows this place is a crack house,
they ought to get somebody in there and do something about
it."
According to HUD records, the government knew bad things
were beginning to happen at Edgewood I in 1985, when an
open-air crack market was operating on the plaza outside the
building. Some of the dealers and users were using vacant
Edgewood I apartments as hideouts: a few had become tenants.
HUD inspectors noted that the building's managers were
exercising "poor tenant selection."
A Disastrous Slide
By 1987, the swimming pool,
shared by the two buildings, was closed; Edgewood I couldn't
pay its share of the maintenance. The cement parking lot
behind Edgewood I collapsed. Two years later, the plumbing,
mended in various haphazard ways, took on a life of its own,
sprouting leaks and flushing toilets spontaneously In the
middle of the night. Heat, air conditioning and hot water
became sporadic. By 1989, 45 of its units were vacant.
Tenants who had portable rent vouchers from HUD moved out,
but most of those remaining--a mixture of single-parent
families and elderly on slim or nonexistent pensions--were
stuck. Their subsidies tied them to the building.
In 1989, Mrs. Nicholson revived the building's long-dormant
tenants' association, which began to complain to HUD.
Writing in a shaking hand, one elderly woman noted her
peeling paint, water leaks and the elevator that could no
longer stop at her floor. "Please, someone keep the building
going," she pleaded. "This is my home, and I live here.
Please don't ask human beings to live like this."
In 1989 and in 1990, HUD rated the building's management
"unsatisfactory." In 1991, when HUD's regional office found
"strong indications of mismanagement," SPl's regional vice
president responded that the building was managed "at a
level the owner feels to be outstanding based on a property
with a need for a several million dollar rehab, located in a
high crime area."
Continuing Problems
To be sure, there were
sporadic attempts to repair things. HUD called in an
architect, Edward M. Johnson, to estimate the cost of fixing
up 20 apartments. He noted that many of them were in a
section that had roof leaks and moldy goo seeping out of
airconditioning vents. Such repairs "didn't make any sense,"
he recalls.
Nevertheless, they were done. Jack Kemp, then secretary of
HUD, had become outraged over conditions at another
HUD-subsidized building in Washington, and consequently some
of its tenants were being moved, temporarily, to the
refurbished units at Edgewood I. Cassandra Burnett, a
retired nurse, moved into one on the second floor and
discovered water leaking in from the roof, four floors
above. The sink, her husband, Thomas, says, spewed water
"like a geyser, like Yellowstone National Park." "The bottom
line," she says, "is we don't use our sink."
At nearby Shaed Elementary School, children from Edgewood I
started showing up dirty. Unable to bathe at home because of
a lack of hot water, they were allowed to take showers at
school, says the principal Brenda Richards. The school also
began holding parent discussion groups, where frustrations
over Edgewood I's conditions often come out. "The office
staff and I were joking the other day. They said this isn't
a school, it's more like a social-work annex," Ms. Richards
says.
In 1993, President Clinton ordered the federal government to
do something about Washington's high crime areas. That
brought Park Police to Edgewood I, although it is several
blocks from the nearest park.
"It was the most rewarding thing I've ever done," recalls
Lt. Robert Kass, head of the unit. While the District's
police were being run ragged in the neighborhood going from
call to call, Lt. Kass's 36 officers moved in on the drug
business, making more than 1,500 arrests. The Park Police
became neighborhood heroes.
Nine months later, though, their money, scrounged from other
Park Police programs, ran out. "What was kind of odd at the
end was the word got around [among the crack-sellers] that
we were leaving. They told our officers, 'Five more days,
and you guys are gone. ' They were looking forward to it,"
Lt. Kass recalls. When the police left, the drug dealers
came back.
Seen from a distance, the buildings still look a lot alike,
but Edgewood II has eight vacancies and Edgewood I has 131.
Thomas Bender, 69, head of the Edgewood II tenants'
association says he has no complaints about maintenance in
his building. What he dreads are the long, lonely walks past
the boarded-up windows of the complex next door, which
includes a few garden apartments. "We were informed last
year that HUD was supposed to start working on those places
and renovate them," he says. "All they're being used for now
is a shooting gallery."
Mr. Bender will need patience. HUD's dealings with owners of
decaying buildings is a slow, elaborate dance. Having
decreed Edgewood l's management "unsatisfactory" starting in
1989, HUD followed in January 1992 with an order banning SPI
from engaging in any new HUD sponsored projects for one
year. That seemed to have little effect on Mr. Pfleger who
has shifted his attention to selling wholesale long-distance
telephone time.
In March 1992, Edgewood l's owners defaulted on their
mortgage. That May, HUD demanded that Mr. Pfleger find a
better on-site manager. In October, G. Richard Dunnells, one
of Mr. Pfleger's lawyers, warned HUD that if it didn't offer
more rental subsidies or subsidize the sale of Edgewood I to
a nonprofit group, the owners would turn the rotting hulk
back to HUD, which holds the mortgage.
That threw the problem into the lap of Helen M. Dunlap,
HUD's current deputy assistant secretary for multifamily
housing. Visiting Edgewood I in the summer of 1993, she was
"appalled," she says. But HUD was hamstrung by its own
rules, which required it not only to repair the building but
also to give the tenants 15 years of subsidized rent if they
had to move. She didn't have the money.
This year, the rules eased, but then HUD's overall policy
changed as the Clinton Administration's program to downsize
the department took hold. Ms. Dunlap is studying HUD's
latest policy, which is to move tenants, tear down
dilapidated buildings and sell the land. The General
Accounting Office says that that is the only cost-effective
solution for Edgewood I.
But cost-effectiveness is never the only criteria when it
comes to low income property. Mr. Ford, as the builder,
feels obligated to try to save Edgewood I. The buildings
"are kind of like my babies" explains Mr. Ford, who feels
guilty about selling Edgewood I in the first place and would
like to prevent the continued decline of the neighborhood.
He has formed a nonprofit corporation that will attempt to
raise $6 million and mobilize neighborhood groups to help
rehabilitate it. If he delivers, Ms. Dunlap says HUD will
throw in a $13 million grant. "We have made a lot of
commitments on this property over the years," she says. The
deal will be negotiated over the next 60 days.
As for Mr. Pneger, he and his lawyers and investors are
looking at a procedure that the IRS calls "recapture." When
and if they decide to sell Edgewood I, federal income taxes
on the $8.7 million they have sheltered by using the
dilapidated building as a deduction will come due. The blow
would fall largely on the limited partners.
Asked about Edgewood I's decline, Mr. Pfleger blamed HUD's
stinginess and "tenant vandalism," an "unbelievable increase
in gang violence and drug activity, and declining occupancy
due to lack of interested market rate tenants." Explaining
the radically different history of Edgewood II, the building
next door, he wrote: "They are two distinct and different
kinds of developments, with their own special problems and
needs."
Indeed they are, now. Edgewood I tenants feel a strong need
to pretend things are getting better. When Mrs. Nicholson
comes back from church on Sundays, she steels herself, then
breezes through the crack dealers as if they weren't there.
Marie Porter, 69, a proud, fragile woman who suffers from
asthma and a bad back, often pretends that she doesn't live
at Edgewood at all: "A lot of my friends don't know where I
live. I have a postal box number and an unlisted
telephone."
   
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